Dating market economics

Content
  • The Dating Market: The Economics of a Relationship
  • How an Economist sees the Dating Market
  • The Economics Of Post-Collegiate Dating
  • Attraction Inequality and the Dating Economy
  • Economics and Dating Have a Lot in Common with Each Other
  • 3 Insights About Dating From a Stanford Economist
  • The Economics Of Dating: This Is Why Dating In 2017 Suuuuucks

The dating world is, in fact, its own market, with complex economic judgments taking place all the time. That is according to Dr. Some of those qualities might be age or attractiveness – and some are financial. Indeed, just go on popular dating sites such as Match. So, does that matter?

The Dating Market: The Economics of a Relationship

But, what is dating? And just as importantly, how does it work? Wikipedia defines dating as follows: In other words, any one person in the dating world is evaluating whether to date another person in the context of all the other people available to date, and in the context of all the other people who would want to date the person being evaluated. More specifically, the dating market is a two-sided matching market, which is described courtesy of Nobel Prize Winner and one of my personal academic idols Al Roth: A market is two-sided if there are two sets of agents, and if an agent from one side of the market can be matched only with an agent from the other side.

In these matching markets, both agents must agree to the match, i. Before we continue, please review the following disclaimers and assumptions. If any of these assumptions seem unrealistic to you, then the entire model will fail to withstand your scrutiny. In order to describe the model, we will first need to develop some concepts from Economics.

To make the discussion easier, I will introduce some notation. Of course, people in the dating market are both choosers and options since both parties will have to consent to date each other, but when discussing the perspective of choosers we will consider only one side of the market choosing the other, such as women choosing from male options.

These dating points may be evaluated uniquely for each person doing the evaluation, so chooser X may evaluate option Y and assign them x dating points, while chooser Z may evaluate the same option Y but assign them a different number of dating points z. This is a formal statement of the simpler concept that given two or more choices of potential people to date, people are likely to have some preference among the choices based on differences between the attributes of the choices. The second fundamental idea pertains to the way people differ among attributes and how choosers rank those attributes.

Consider evaluating a car for purchase. There are many different features associated with a car such as, speed, acceleration, horsepower, environmental impact, reliability, car style, car color, etc. In general, almost everyone will agree that higher ratings of speed, acceleration, and reliability will be better than lower ratings of speed, acceleration, and reliability.

Similarly, everyone will generally agree that a low environmental impact is better than a high environmental impact. However, not everyone will agree that a certain car color is better than another car color is black obviously better than blue? These two terms describe behavior at the market level but do not describe the magnitude of individual preferences for these attributes.

For instance, someone might be willing to trade off a certain amount of horsepower for a specified lower environmental impact, but everyone would agree these are both desirable things. Dating markets are vertically and horizontally differentiated; there are attributes that all choosers agree are desirable of options and attributes for which choosers disagree on desirability.

To make this more concrete, all choosers will likely agree that a high rating on something like social intelligence is more preferable in an option than a low rating, whereas some choosers will agree that an option who is into spectator sports is desirable while other choosers will disagree. The categorization of specific attributes into the vertically differentiated category and into the horizontally differentiated category is a detail which may be up for debate, but I will attempt to make a case for a list of attributes that fall into the vertically differentiated category using data and the academic literature later in another article.

We now combine the two economic concepts we describe above to generate a description of how the dating market works. A chooser can then do this for any set of presented options and generate a preference list among that set. Hold aside practical considerations for the moment and imagine, then, that we can do this for all choosers evaluating all options and arrive at a series of these preference rankings corresponding to the number of choosers and the number of options available specifically, number of choosers x the number of options x 2.

The information contained in the sum of these preference rankings defines the dating market: Take women as choosers evaluating men as options. The second plot echoes the first but adds an additional dimension, not only do women like men who are taller than themselves, the number of likes scales as the man gets taller. In other words, height is a vertically differentiated good when women evaluate men, so taller is better for men when viewed as an option.

We can do this for all our vertically differentiated attributes and give our options a composite market level value of their vertical attributes. We can do this similarly for men as choosers evaluating women as options on their vertically differentiated attributes. To keep this digestible, we will now do two things before continuing. The first is that we will build up this model very slowly, adding additional complications as we go.

The second is that we will limit the market to men and women in order to make it easier to think about how these interactions might actually play out, rather than thinking about the real world situation of thousands or millions of market participants. Based on our analysis as described, we now have market values for the vertical differentiation of each of our groups of options, i. There are potentially a lot of ways we can match people in this market but we will consider three ways we can use our model to go about matching these men and women in our micro-market when considering only vertical differentiation:.

These have their problems however, with 1 and 2 having largely similar problems. In the case of the first two, these preference lists are tailored to the individual chooser, not at a market level, so each of these unique preference functions one chooser may value an inch of height, for instance, more than another chooser will generate a different list and the matchings will be good for the side of the market the preference list is being based off, but it may be bad for the other side being matched.

Given that one of our assumptions is self-awareness, this may lead to non-consent for some number of matches if the matches are too far apart. Assortative matching has some problems as well. In practice this may be a small concern, however, since the option that is more highly ranked may have the chooser at a low rank. Again, the impact of our system that not only must one choose, but one must be chosen will tend to reinforce similar rankings.

Assortative matching will potentially play out as follows: Choosers evaluate their options and approach their highest preference. Since the market values are developed by the preferences of these choosers, most choosers should agree on who the highest valued options are and approach this subset of the options. The choosers in this subset will then see the value of the options approaching them and make a selection of the highest value from the pool, thus removing them from the pool available to match.

The approaching choosers will then move onto their next ranked preference and the process will continue. Using Ariely as a certification of the assortative matching model for a market with only vertical differentiation and the argument above, we will assert that this model best describes real world behavior in this type of market. Moreover, there may be so many of these horizontal dimensions that it is not possible to aggregate them in a meaningful way at all.

For a sample of what these sorts of horizontal preferences might look like, consider the following:. All of these and more would make up horizontal valuations of options. To make it more concrete, perhaps a chooser is fluent in both English and Chinese and they value someone who is also fluent in English and Chinese but would be happy with someone who is only able to speak English. In a market where the native language is English, additional fluency in Chinese may not be relevant at all to most other market participants, so this fluency is uniquely valuable to this chooser.

This is what makes horizontally differentiated attributes difficult to incorporate into our model from a mathematical point of view. So how do we think about this model? First, let us make a simplifying assumption for this iteration of the model that there is perfect information so it costs nothing to obtain information about the horizontal values of options, a chooser can just look at an option and know what their horizontal value is.

There are two main possibilities here depending on the size of the horizontal values as compared to the size of the vertical values. It is an empirical question how the size of valuation of vertical and horizontal attributes compare to each other. An astute reader may note here that according to Ariely, assortative matching seems to be how people in the real world behave in the dating market, and potentially conclude that, given this observation, it must be the case that vertical values are much larger than the horizontal ones so that our model behaves as 1 above, but this is premature.

Specifically, we are assuming costless perfect information here, which is not at all true in the real world. Fortunately for us, when we develop our real world model next, it may not matter much how the sizes of valuation of the vertical and horizontal attributes compare. This is the closest version of the model to the real world.

In this model we have vertically and horizontally differentiated attributes as before, but now we introduce two things: We will assume that vertically differentiated goods tend to be easy to observe, things like height, income, age, etc, while horizontally differentiated goods are difficult to observe. So how do choosers evaluate options given easily observable vertical qualities, costly to observe horizontal qualities, and finite resources available for screening?

One good strategy is assortative matching. Through self-awareness, a chooser can get a sense of their own vertical value on the dating market and, through observation, can get a sense of the vertical value of any option being evaluated. Of course, every chooser wants to get a very high value match and avoid low value matches, but since we require consent the only way a chooser gets a high value match is if that high value option consents to match with the chooser. Consequently, we will generally see options reject propositions from lower vertically valued matches, even if they could potentially have high horizontal values, because to accept a proposition requires incurring the screening cost!

Imagine the following scenario in our person micro-market: The 50 rank chooser propositions the 2 rank option. The 2 rank option does not know the horizontal value of the 50 rank chooser but has two possible responses, accept or reject. If the 2 rank option accepts, then they have to incur the screening cost and reduce the total number of potential screens they can do since they have finite resources, and the best outcome the option can hope for is that the 50 rank chooser has an incredibly high horizontal value, which will be difficult to know since it is not clear how to assess horizontal values.

However, since this behavior is symmetric when we flip the choosing and option groups, what we find is that people match at similar vertical values, i. The model presented here is not perfect and most certainly not complete. It is built on a lot of assumptions about the size of values and cost of screening, etc, which all require empirical work to determine as well as further modeling to verify some of the statements.

More than anything, it can be considered an early iteration of a hypothesis around how the dating market works with need for testing. All these caveats aside, I think it presents a model of the dating market that is useful in thinking about how people match today, how people might do better at their searching for a partner, and how economists and technology firms might think about how to make digital matching platforms more efficient.

There are still some big ideas to explore here. Namely, what are the vertically differentiated attributes for the two groups, what happens when there is an imbalance in the market, i. These will be explored in other articles. Thanks for reading. You can find me bradchattergoon on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Sign in Get started. Business and Technology Personal Resume. Dec 28, This model is intended for heterosexual dating markets. There may be some similarities to homosexual or other dating markets but they are outside the purview of the article.

This is not the intended purpose of the article. The model discussed will attempt to incorporate data and the academic literature to describe the dating market based on observed behavior, but it does not suggest that the described behavior should be how the market, or people, should behave, only that this is how they do behave at a market level i. The general model is expected to hold but some details may be up for debate or revaluation without changing the overall model.

I will attempt to make clear the details which may be up for debate. This means that when a match is made, the couple being matched is removed from the market, i. People on the dating market have a sense of their own value on the dating market. There can also be information via their exposure to messaging. These will inform their sense of who finds them attractive and give a sense of where their value is at least relative to others.

What I would like to argue is that the “Dating Market” explains the basic concepts of economics in very basic terms because it is a market in. Dating is no different. Investing is done with a mobile and unpredictable market. Immediate and long-term choices are made based on what.

Either way, the book is smart, oddly practical, and written by someone with a nice sense of humor. Some of the points Oyer makes seem commonsensical at least after he explains them. Oyer calls this cheap talk and notes that this is not limited to individuals; corporations and political campaigns are also often guilty of cheap talk. Other points Oyer makes may not be things everyone wants to think about. As a result, many perfectly eligible and attractive people are single, some great potential employees are unemployed, and some really nice houses sit empty and unsold.

Jesus said that the poor would always be with us.

But, what is dating? And just as importantly, how does it work? Wikipedia defines dating as follows:

The Economics Of Post-Collegiate Dating

We live in a world where lashing out due to rejection , ghosting , fading, cheating , and unsolicited dick pics has become the norm rather than the exception. We no longer treat one another as humans, and why would we? No one seems to care about actually doing the right thing anymore, anyway. The emotional harm due to dealing with horrible dates, bad interactions, and shallow websites is palpable. To illustrate this point, I want to start by talking about oysters.

Attraction Inequality and the Dating Economy

Download this podcast. Paul, thanks so much for talking with us today. So when I go to the grocery store, if I spend a lot of time scanning the shelves, I could be doing other things. And if I want to buy a new house and I go from open house to open house, I could be doing other things. And so when we think about a place where investing and getting what you really want is particularly valuable, it seems like the market for a life partner is hard to beat. We just buy one share of whatever company it is or we just buy one ton of soybeans or whatever it is. So in an ideal world, we would have the ability to search every single person out there and pick the ideal match. But the world is not ideal and going about searching through people is very costly. So online dating has actually provided a boon to the market, or at least from my perspective I think of it that way.

Finding love is a hot commodity—something heavily in demand, but not so easily obtained.

Dating in college has its own rules. Your eyes meet across a sticky-floored basement. Money matters because dating is a way of sizing someone up and assessing the value of their company.

Economics and Dating Have a Lot in Common with Each Other

Ранняя юность Грега Хейла не была омрачена криминальными историями, поскольку он провел ее в Корпусе морской пехоты США, где и познакомился с компьютером. Он стал лучшим программистом корпуса, и перед ним замаячила перспектива отличной военной карьеры. Но за два дня до окончания третьего боевого дежурства в его будущем произошел резкий зигзаг.

В пьяной драке Хейл случайно убил сослуживца. Корейское искусство самозащиты, тхеквондо, оказалось в большей мере смертоносным, нежели оборонительным. Военной службе пришел конец. Отсидев некоторое время в тюрьме, Хейл занялся поисками места программиста в частных компаниях. Он не скрывал от нанимателей того, что случилось с ним во время службы в морской пехоте, и стремился завоевать их расположение, предлагая работать без оплаты в течение месяца, чтобы они узнали ему цену.

В желающих принять его на работу не было недостатка, а увидав, что он может творить на компьютере, они уже не хотели его отпускать. Профессионализм Хейла достиг высокого уровня, и у него появились знакомые среди интернет-пользователей по всему миру. Он был представителем новой породы киберпсихов и общался с такими же ненормальными в других странах, посещая непристойные сайты и просиживая в европейских чатах.

3 Insights About Dating From a Stanford Economist

Она смотрела на коммандера и второй раз за этот день не могла его узнать. Вдруг она ощутила страшное одиночество. Стратмор увидел пятна крови на ее блузке и тотчас пожалел о своей вспышке. – Боже, Сьюзан, с тобой все в порядке. Она промолчала.

The Economics Of Dating: This Is Why Dating In 2017 Suuuuucks

Сколько? – быстро спросил Беккер. – Сотню баксов. Беккер нахмурился. – У меня только песеты. – Какая разница.

Он вцепился в эту красотку так, словно боялся, что она сбежит, – и я бы ее отлично понял. Ей-ей. Обхватил ее своими ручищами. Да еще хвастался, что снял ее на весь уик-энд за три сотни долларов. Это он должен был упасть замертво, а не бедолага азиат.

Как они смогут ему противостоять. Эти аргументы она слышала уже много. Гипотетическое будущее правительство служило главным аргументом Фонда электронных границ. – Стратмора надо остановить! – кричал Хейл.  – Клянусь, я сделаю .

Клушар поморщился: – Вот. Если вам угодно использовать это вульгарное слово. – Но… офицер ничего не сказал о… – Разумеется. Я не сказал ему про спутницу.  – Взмахом руки Клушар величественно отверг вопрос Беккера.  – Они не преступницы – глупо было бы искать их, как обычных жуликов.

In the market for love? Here’s how economics can help